India–Russia Defence Update: India’s defence shopping list keeps landing Russian missiles on the “yes” pile: S-400 deployments, talks about the S-500, interest in long-range air-to-air weapons like the R-37M, while the Su-57 stealth fighter remains stuck in a long “maybe”.
Why are missiles easier to trust?
Missile systems like the S-400 are discrete, mature packages that deliver immediate capability: radars, launchers, missiles and training come as a bundle and can be integrated relatively quickly into existing air-defence architectures.

India has already fielded S-400 batteries, and Indian commanders see tangible operational benefits in layered air defence that practical success makes follow-on buys easier to justify. At the same time, sourcing more missile systems is a straightforward way to blunt air and missile threats along long borders without having to take risky bets on unproven platforms.
Delivery, integratio,n and combat-readiness
Unlike a fighter where stealth, avionics and sensors must integrate with national tactics and platforms, an S-class SAM’s value is measured in radar coverage, missile lethalit,y and command-and-control integration. The S-400 (and potential S-500 discussions) fit India’s immediate strategic requirement for a high-altitude, long-range shield, especially after recent operations that highlighted the value of layered defences. Missiles are also less dependent on complex multinational supply chains for sensitive subsystems, so procurement and sustainment are comparatively simpler.
India–Russia Defence Update: R-37M

The R-37M (exported as RVV-BD) is a long-range beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile intended to take out high-value assets (AWACS, tankers) from standoff ranges. For air forces that want to keep their crews and fighters out of the most dangerous envelopes, an R-37M gives new tactical options, escorting strike packages or deterring support aircraft from entering contested airspace. Its role is complementary: missiles like R-37M don’t replace fighters; they extend their reach.
Russia is still India’s reliable “arms bank” for specialized systems
Historically, one of India’s largest and most integrated defence partners, Russia supplies a broad range of hardware, spares, and institutional familiarity. That long relationship reduces friction: Indian crews already know Russian maintenance culture, logistic lines are established, and interoperability with legacy assets is high.

Politically, Russia has been willing to discuss transfer-of-technology and local production for a range of systems, an attractive offer when New Delhi wants sovereign manufacturing options. Reuters and other outlets note talks about adding S-500 discussions to the bilateral agenda even as the two leaders meet, which shows continuing defence trust at the state level.
India’s S-400 vs Russia’s S-500: Key Differences, Features, and Why It Matters for India’s Defence
Why does the Su-57 raise caution?
Contrast that with the Su-57. It’s a fifth-generation design on paper, but analysts and some Indian planners have questioned whether it has matured into a reliably stealthy, sensor-fused platform. Public reporting and opinion pieces point to problems: developmental engines replaced later, limited production numbers, and doubts raised by how the type has or hasn’t performed in conflict zones. For a high-cost, core fighter buy, India wants evidence of maturity, combat experience, stable supply chains for avionics/engines, and assurance that the platform will evolve. Those signals for the Su-57 are mixed.
India–Russia Defence Update: Geopolitical uncertainty
Buying fighters isn’t just buying airframes, it’s buying long-term sustainment, chips, avionics, and often Western components subject to export controls. Western sanctions on Russia, supply chain disruptions, and unpredictable spare-parts flows increase operational risk. Missiles like the S-400 are packaged with legacy Russian logistics and spare networks that are already embedded in Indian defence planning; fighters with complex multinational components raise more questions about sustainment under sanctions. That practical hazard amplifies caution on Su-57 acquisition.
Missiles deliver tangible, demonstrable deterrence quickly, a force multiplier in a region where threats evolve fast. The Su-57, even if obtained, would need time and investments to reach the kind of stealthy, sensor-fusion maturity that makes fifth-gen fighters transformational. For India, which must modernize across many domains at once, the immediate operational leverage of missile systems often outweighs the uncertain long game of buying an unproven stealth fleet today.

